EVENT BOARDSIZE 19 COM Place: Even Game Fuseki Studies Source: BGJ 1, Summer 1967, Page 2 Copyright British Go Association 1967, 1999 ENDCOM B 1 r16 W 2 p17 MARK A@e17 3@e16 COM White 2: When white directly attacks black 1 the best reply is 3 or A. ENDCOM B 3 e16 MARK B@c16 5@l17 #2 COM Black 3: This play has the advantage of inviting white to play at B, after which black would advance to 5. This latter play would have the double advantage of combining a squeeze attack on white 2 with the formation of a base for expansion in the north west sector. ENDCOM W 4 c5 COM White 4: This stone could have been played in the south east corner instead. ENDCOM B 5 l17 MARK B@c16 A@q17 C@p16 COM Black 5: It is advisable to play here now, whether or not white has played at B. If white should now play in another part of the board, this would permit black to play at 10(A), and white would then naturally play 7(C), which would then allow black to encircle white by playing 6, see variation. As to other white defences against a black play at 10, there is also the possibility of white 12, or C may be played; and there are still other defences not discussed here. ENDCOM VAR B 1 l17 W 2 q4 COM [sgb: "Another part of the board" no meaning to this point.] ENDCOM B 3 q17 W 4 p16 B 5 q14 ENDVAR W 6 q14 MARK #2 COM White 6: With the above dangerous possibility in view, White has chosen this play, which can be either defensive or offensive, according to subsequent developments. The slanting formation, 2 and 6, is called "taisha" or formation of a hundred variuations being one from which countless varieties of opening corner play may develop. ENDCOM B 7 p16 MARK #2 #6 D@r14 E@q15 G@r15 #5 COM Black 7: This is a common play to sever the connection between 2 and 6. It is the most common answer to this formation. There are two other common plays for black, one being D, the other E. 11(G) may be considered feasible, although less common, because of 5. ENDCOM W 8 o16 MARK F@q16 COM White 8: Usually White would now place a stone at F. At this stage of the fuseki, it is of no consequence to discuss the comparative advantages of F and 8. ENDCOM B 9 p15 COM Black 9 - 11: These plays are indispensible after white 8. ENDCOM W 10 q17 B 11 r15 MARK #9-11 COM Black 9 - 11: These plays are indispensible after white 8. ENDCOM W 12 r17 COM White 12: White seizes the valuable 3-3 point which would otherwise have been taken by black. ENDCOM B 13 r11 COM Black 13: By this play, black now seeks compensation in taking territory along the east side. The last plays form a joseki that is not played much these days. ============================= Here let us review the progress of the opening up to this point. In spite of black's initial advantage with 1 in the north east corner, white has later occupied the all important point of 12. Thus, as far as the corner is concerned, white has the advantage. Black, on the other hand, has occupied territory along the east side by his advance to 13. In size of areas, however, white's corner is larger than black's side position. Next, compare the position of 5 and 6. Against black's strong bamboo loint, 6 is practically helpless; whereas 5, although pitted against white's entrenchment in the corner still enjoys the advantage of possible extensions towards the north west. Thus between 5 and 6 the scale of strength leans decidedly in favour of black. ENDCOM W 14 q4 MARK G@p4 H@q3 I@r4 J@r5 K@p3 COM White 14: A good alternative would have been G, but still in the same corner. It is nearly always better to occupy a corner than to make an extension along the side. In this case H or I would not be good, because then black could reply with J or K respectively, gaining an advantage because of the expansion of his territory in the first case, and because of the threat of a pressing down play at L forcing white toward the strong black position and then making a big extension along the south side. ENDCOM VAR W 1 q3 B 2 r5 ENDVAR VAR W 1 r4 B 2 p3 ENDVAR B 15 e4 MARK A@c16 B@d3 COM Black 15: Black here has many alternatives from which to choose; for example, fortification at 22(A) or attacking at 16(B) would be feasible. He has, however, here chosen 15 for the purpose of occupying the south side towards the west. ENDCOM W 16 d3 B 17 e3 W 18 d2 MARK M@d4 N@e5 P@d6 COM White 18: White here has an alternative in M. Then black 19' at at N, white 20' at P. This development occurs frequently and should be remembered. ENDCOM VAR W 1 d4 B 2 e5 W 3 d6 ENDVAR B 19 j3 W 20 c17 MARK \T@e16 A@c16 \S@l17 Q@j17 R@k17 S@c15 COM White 20: White plays here to reduce the black territory in this sector. Ordinarily, the attack on 'triangle' would be made at 22(A). In this cas e, however, black has 'square' as a valuable outpost to the initial corner play of 'triangle'. This outpost might also have been at Q or R. With any of these three points, it is advisable for white to break into his opponent's position by playing at the 3-3 point, 20. White now awaits, among other possibilities a counter-attack with Black 21' at S. However this is bad, for the variation follows. ENDCOM VAR W 1 c17 B 2 c15 W 3 d16 B 4 d15 W 5 e17 B 6 f17 W 7 f18 B 8 f16 MARK A@g17 COM (Black 8' could be at A). ENDCOM VAR B 1 g17 ENDVAR W 9 g18 MARK B@h18 C@k17 \S@l17 COM In this case where the black outpost is at \s, B would be white's next play in t his region; but if the black stone were at C then 9 would be white's last play in this area for the time being. This sequence would cost black a great deal, as \s then becomes redundant. ENDCOM ENDVAR B 21 d17 COM Black 21: In order to avoid the developments in the variation to move 20 above, black guards the north west side with sente and gains much territory. ENDCOM W 22 c16 MARK T@d15 U@b14 V@h16 A@e14 COM White 22 extends. Often Black 23' at T, white 24' at U follows; but in this case it would leave the black position open to a white attack at V. Black therefore finds it advisable to play 23(A) next. ENDCOM B 23 e14 W 24 c13 COM White 24 advances down the west side while black is building up his territory in the north. ENDCOM B 25 o15 COM Black 25 now takes the initiative and bottles up the white group in the corner. This is a severe blow to white. ENDCOM W 26 n16 B 27 n18 W 28 o18 B 29 n17 W 30 o17 COM White 30: Black, by threatening to cut at 30 twice, continues bottling up white. ENDCOM B 31 l15 COM Black 31: Black still having sente, completes his bottling up operation and increases his territory. ENDCOM W 32 l3 MARK #14 W@h15 X@s17 COM White 32: White now having sente turns to this point, which is an offensive against the black formation and also an ambitious extension along the south side from 14. White here had an alternative in W. (At an opportune time, black may choose to attact the entire north east position by playing X. Then the variation develops into a ko, for the life of the white group.) ENDCOM VAR W 1 l3 B 2 s17 COM (Sub variation to make move numbers match BGJ) ENDCOM VAR B 1 s17 W 2 s18 B 3 t18 W 4 s16 B 5 t16 MARK All ENDVAR ENDVAR B 33 r6 COM Black 33: This has a similar purpose to that of white 32. ENDCOM W 34 o4 COM White 34: A natural sequel to 33, enlarging and securing his territory. ENDCOM B 35 e12 MARK W@h15 COM Black 35: Should black omit this play, he would still be vulnerable to a white attack at W. Black's play therefore has a twofold defensive significance; it defends the black territory along the north side, and at the same time indirectly strengthens the black group of three stones in the south west. It also serves to apply pressure on the white formation down the west side. thus it will be seen that 35 is a good example of a play with triple effectiveness. ========================= A rough estimate of the prospective territory reveals that black is ahead, but the south side is not yet clarified enough to make a proper evaluation possible as white is bound to gain a few points in attacking the three stones in the south west, and the two in the east as well. ENDCOM