EVENT WHITE Anon BLACK Anon BOARDSIZE 19 PLACE Even Game Fuseki Studies - Part 2 KOMI 5.5 SOURCE BGJ 2, Autumn 1967, Page 18 COM Copyright British Go Association 1967, 2001 ENDCOM B 1 R16 W 2 O16 B 3 Q14 MARK E@J17 D@E17 C@C16 B@M17 A@R17 O16 COM Black 3: This is the usual reply to a white attack at 2, a play not seen much now, being a defence against a white offensive at A. Black may, however, venture a squeeze play at B. The advisability of such a play would be greatly increased if white C and black D had already been played in the north-west corner, with a high probability of a white squeeze attack at E against black D. If Black omits 3, White is likely to play A and occupy the corner. At this early stage of the opening there is little sense in Black's playing elsewhere for the purpose of occupying another corner. ENDCOM W 4 D16 MARK F@R10 E@J17 D@E17 C@C16 COM White 4: White may well play C instead. Such a play may serve a good purpose; for if black should attempt an offensive by playing D, White could profitably counter with a squeeze attack at E. ENDCOM B 5 E3 MARK G@R10 F@D3 COM Black 5: This stone could have been played on any of the ordinary initial corner positions except F. To play in the southeast corner, however, would be questionable, as it would tend to make the black formation unbalanced as black would have concentrated too many stones on this side. ENDCOM W 6 D5 MARK D16 COM White 6: White might well have played in the southeast corner instead. the play was here at 6 for the purpose of utilising 4 to form a a large territory on the west side. ENDCOM B 7 C4 W 8 C5 B 9 D4 MARK H@R10 G@B4 COM Black 9: This could have been played at G, see BGJ 1 page 2 move 18. ENDCOM W 10 E5 B 11 F4 MARK J@K3 H@F3 COM Black 11: Made to guard against a possible play at H, at the same time suggesting that the next play would be around J It has a third advantage, also, as a preparation for a daring counter attack from 17. ENDCOM W 12 R5 MARK M@R10 D@P3 C@P4 L@Q5 K@Q4 COM White 12' could equally well have been played at K, L or 13 (C); but if played at 15 (D) , black would naturally take the oppressive position L and build up a secure territory along the east side. ENDCOM B 13 P4 W 14 Q3 B 15 P3 W 16 Q2 B 17 D9 MARK Q@C14 P@C9 N@B9 M@L3 COM Black 17: This Black initiative shatters White's ambitions along the west side. A black play of 17' at M (following the joseki) would have been wrong, for then 18' at N or P would be too good. Black may well have played this stone lower, at P. Should White then extend his three stone wall black would secure a double advantage with 19' at 18 or Q, dominating the whole of the west side and likewise attacking the white stone 4. Let us here speculate on White's possible response to 17... ENDCOM VAR B 1 D9 W 2 G6 VAR W 1 C11 COM Suppose White should make a squeeze attack with 1, ENDCOM B 2 G6 COM Black would launch an encircling movement with 2. ENDCOM W 3 E8 COM White would then accept the challenge and try to break the seige with 3. A running encounter would then ensue.with 4 thru 9. ENDCOM B 4 E9 W 5 F8 B 6 F9 W 7 G8 B 8 G9 W 9 H8 B 10 D8 COM Then Black would shift the line of attack, and by playing 10 attempt to cut the white formation in two, ENDCOM W 11 F6 MARK F6 D8 H8 G9 G8 F9 F8 E9 E8 G6 MARK C11 COM ...which White would then guard against by 11. Examine carefully the resulting formation at this point. Note what would be the position of 1. The black formation would be strongly entrenched with 4-6-8-10. White's 1 would be dangerously close to the black entrenchment and also too far from its ally at 'triangle'. Thus it will be easily seen that 1 would have been played unwisely. ENDCOM ENDVAR B 3 C14 MARK C14 G6 D9 COM Should White extend his wall by 2, Black would immediately seize the all-important point 3, and occupy the west side. White would thus play right into Black's hands. ENDCOM ENDVAR W 18 C13 B 19 F8 W 20 G6 B 21 J4 W 22 H7 B 23 H9 W 24 K17 B 25 R7