A few simple rules ... limitless possibilities

British Go Journal No. 2. Autumn 1967. Page 18.

Honinbo Shusai

Part 1 of this series is on BGJ 1 page 2.

Study 2

The game-file in SGF format.

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Figure 1

• Black 3: This is the usual reply to a white attack at 2, a play not seen much now, being a defence [ against ] a white offensive at A.
  Black may, however, venture a squeeze play at B. The advisability of such a play would be greatly increased if white C and black D had already been played in the north-west corner, with a high probability of a white squeeze attack at E against black D.
  If Black omits 3, White is likely to play A and occupy the corner.
  At this early stage of the opening there is little sense in Black's playing elsewhere for the purpose of occupying another corner.
• White 4: White may well play C instead. Such a play may serve a good purpose; for if black should attempt an offensive by playing D, White could profitably counter with a squeeze attack at E.
• Black 5: This stone could have been played on any of the ordinary initial corner positions except F. To play in the southeast corner, however, would be questionable, as it would tend to make the black formation unbalanced as black would have concentrated too many stones on this side.
• White 6: White might well have played in the southeast corner instead. the play was here at 6 for the purpose of utilising 4 to form a a large territory on the west side.
• Black 9: This could have been played at G, see BGJ 1 page 2 move 18.
• Black 11: Made to guard against a possible play at H, at the same time suggesting that the next play would be around J It has a third advantage, also, as a preparation for a daring counter attack from 17.
• White 12' could equally well have been played at K, L or 13; but if played at 15 , black would naturally take the oppressive position L and build up a secure territory along the east side.
• Black 13: this is largely determined by the black formation in the south-west corner. By this "high" (on the fourth line) attack, followed by his blocking play 15,black gains a valuable initiative.
• Black 17: This Black initiative shatters White's ambitions along the west side. A black play of 17' at M (following the joseki) would have been wrong, for then 18' at N or P would be too good. Black may well have played this stone lower, at P. Should White then extend his three stone wall black would secure a double advantage with 19' at 18 or Q, dominating the whole of the west side and likewise attacking the white stone 4.
  [N & P seem misplaced. SGB] Let us here speculate on White's possible response to 17. Should White extend his wall by 18' at 20, Black would immediately seize the all-important point 18, and occupy the west side. White would thus play right into Black's hands.
  

  Diagram 1

  In Dia 1, suppose White should make a squeeze attack with 18 (R in Fig 1). Black would launch an encircling movement with 19.. White would then accept the challenge and try to break the seige with 20. A running encounter would then ensue.with 21 thru 26. Then Black would shift the line of attack, and by playing 27 attempt to cut the white formation in two, which White would then guard against by 28.
  Examine carefully the resulting formation at this point. Note what would be the position of 18. The black formation would be strongly entrenched with 27-17-21-23-25. White's 18 would be dangerously close to the black entrenchment and also too far from its ally at 4. Thus it will be easily seen that 18 would have been played unwisely.
• Black 18 in Fig 1: Wary of the danger just described, white has taken a defensive position at 18 rather than R and is planning a gradual attack on black from the strengthened north-west formation. Moderation thus marks this play by White. It also promises to completely secure the corner with another play at S or D.
• Black 19: This might as well have been played at the corresponding point 20. It is also a good example of an attacking keima play, see BGJ 1 page 7 section D.
• White 20: This play is now absolutely necessary.
• Black 21 is defensive in the sense that it ends support to the black stones in the south-east corner, and defends the black potential along the south side. It is offensive in the sense that it threatens encirclement of white's four stones again.
• White 22: A clever play! It threatens, by way of T, the now isolated formation of 17-19 and prepares the way for the valuable opportunity of playing 24 before Black can do so. Should White play 22' at U, Black would now seize the position of 24 at once because the black formation is not now threatened.
• Black 23: This double keima forms a virtual extension (see BGJ 1 page 7 section A) and should be remembered.
• Black 25: This is comparable to White's play 24 in its importance as affecting the game as a whole, and its ultimate outcome. With this play the fuseki is at an end. Let us, however, speculate on the next few possibilities.

Diagram 2

Diagram 3

White's next stone (26') may be hurled into the black formation at A in Dia 2.

Again 26 might be pressed against as Dia 2.

There is still another possibility, 26 in Dia 3. 27 would be followed by 28, and should Black extend with 29 white could cut with 30 and capture with the sequence to 34. However Black would gain the advantage with 35 securing the initiative.